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MONTANA'S EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A
COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE OF MONTANA'S
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT
ACT IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
UNFAIR DISMISSAL LAW
Michael Bennett*
Editors' Note
The following article, written by Michael Bennett of the
Southampton Institute in Southampton, England, demonstrates
that Montana's pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge From Em-
ployment Act (WDFEA) continues to receive national and even
international attention. Professor Bennett's comparative critique
serves as a companion piece to another article on the WDFEA,
which will follow in volume 57:2. That article, written by Don
Robinson, a labor practitioner from Butte, Montana, will pro-
vide an up-to-date, annotated catalog of case law under the
WDFEA since the Act's passage in 1987.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987 Montana passed its Wrongful Discharge From Em-
ployment Act (WDFEA).1 From that time a substantial propor-
tion of the working population of at least one American state has
had statutory employment protection to rely on; elsewhere in the
United States, a remedy for arbitrary dismissal still generally
depends on finding an exception to the termination-at-will rule.
The success or otherwise of the WDFEA is of interest throughout
the United States, as a similar statute, the Model Employment
Termination Act,2 has been drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Law.
The Montana experiment is of interest elsewhere as well. In
Europe, countries have well-developed systems of employment
protection, often guided by the International Labour
Organisation's Recommendation no. 119 (1963), which states:
"termination of employment should not take place unless there is
* Reader in Law, Southampton Institute. I would like to thank Judge Gordon
Bennett, Professor Bill Corbett, Professor Bob Hollman, Jim Nys, LeRoy Schramm,
Professor Rodney Smith, Professor Karen Vinton and the University of Montana for
assisting my research in Montana.
1. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1995) (originally enacted as sec. 1,
ch. 641, Laws of 1987).
2. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. (Supp. 1995).
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a valid reason ... connected with the capacity or conduct of the
worker or based on the operational requirements of the under-
taking, establishment or service."3
In the United Kingdom, the main development came in
1971, with the introduction of the law of unfair dismissal. There
was a general consensus for its introduction, but few are wholly
satisfied with the way the law of unfair dismissal has developed.
The law has been the subject of numerous amendments, many of
which merely reflect the views of changing government policy.
The United Kingdom may be on the point of radical change fol-
lowing a government green paper, which includes a proposal to
introduce arbitration to resolve complaints of unfair dismissal."
In contrast, Montana had a blank sheet on which to design its
new law. Discovering how successful Montana legislators in 1987
have been will very much inform debates within the United
Kingdom.
This article does not attempt a complete review of both the
WDFEA and unfair dismissal law in the United Kingdom. Rath-
er, the article examines the WDFEA in light of the United
Kingdom's experience. Such a comparison is fraught with diffi-
culties, given the legal, industrial relations, political and econom-
ic differences, but in both the United States and the United
Kingdom there are similar debates as to whether increasing
employee rights will have a detrimental effect on the economy.
Generally, the WDFEA was introduced in Montana to relieve a
perceived burden on business.' In a similar way, the United
Kingdom government sees competitiveness as vital and has re-
fused to collaborate with its European partners to accelerate the
development of worker rights.6 The article concludes that, de-
spite these protective interests, effective statutory systems have
advantages for both employees and employers, and that such
systems are generally preferable to common law employment-at-
will doctrines.
3. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1964, CMND 2548, at 6 (Eng.).
4. RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS DISPUTES: OPTIONS FOR REFORM, 1994,
CMND 2707 (Eng.).
5. See Leroy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94 (1990).
6. In 1989 the other 11 members of the European Community agreed on the
Social Charter. In 1992 the United Kingdom gained an opt-out of the Social Charter
to the European Union Treaty (Maastricht).
[Vol. 57
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II. BACKGROUND
Both United Kingdom and American employment law share
a common root in the presumption of a yearly hiring. Blackstone
stated in 1765 that:
If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the
law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of
natural equity that the servant shall serve, and the master
maintain him throughout all the revolutions of the respective
seasons; as well when there is work to be done as where there
is not; but the contract may be made for any longer or smaller
term.
7
In the United Kingdom the presumption was initially applied to
agricultural workers, and was later extended to general employ-
ment in 1827 in Beeston v. Collyer.8 The rule dominated British
jurisprudence throughout the 19th century, despite evidence that
the growing industrial society preferred more flexible employ-
ment arrangements.' The presumption of yearly hiring came to
an end in 1938 in De Stempels v. Dunkels,1° which decided that
the courts should imply terms based on the intentions of the
parties." The courts had previously recognized that employ-
ment in certain occupations was customarily terminable on no-
tice. 2 Once the yearly hiring presumption was gone, the mod-
ern presumption of an indefinite period of employment, termina-
ble on reasonable notice, took hold. 13
The modern presumption requiring a notice period gave
employees a cushion against unemployment; however, it was
frequently a very short period, and could always be reduced by
an agreement. Parliament first attempted to tackle insecurity in
employment by passing the Contract of Employment Act of 1963,
which introduced minimum periods of notice. Shortly thereafter,
the Redundancy Payments Act of 1965 followed. This Act began
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "425 (footnotes omitted).
8. 4 Bing 309, 130 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ct.C.P. 1827).
9. See SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY ch. IX (1902); RE-
PORTS FROM COMMITTEES: THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MASTER AND SERVANT, 1866,
IT 79-81 (testimony of G. Newton), 386-90 (testimony of A- Campbell), 576-79 (testi-
mony of A. McDonald), 808-09 (testimony of W. Dronfield), 916-20 (testimony of J.
Normansell) (Eng.).
10. 1 All E.R. 238 (Eng. C.A. 1938).
11. Id. at 246-47.
12. See, e.g., Turner v. Mason, 14 M & W 112, 116-17, 153 Eng. Rep. 411, 413
(Ex. 1845).
13. McClelland v. Northern Ireland Gen. Health Serv. Bd., 1 W.L.R 594, 599
(Eng. H.L. 1957).
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treating employment as a property right, by awarding compen-
sation when positions disappeared for economic reasons. But the
most significant development in United Kingdom labor law came
through the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which introduced
unfair dismissal. Although subject to many amendments, the
basic structure of the law remains the same today and is largely
found in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978
(EPCA) and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolida-
tion) Act of 1992 (TULRCA).
Under these acts in the United Kingdom, unfair dismissal is
determined by an Industrial Tribunal which has a legally quali-
fied chair. It also has two lay representatives, one from each side
of industry. This tribunal is the final arbiter of fact. Appeals on
points of law go to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, which is
similarly constituted, except the chair is a High Court Judge.
Further appeals go to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) and
House of Lords.
In the United States, cases at the end of the 19th century
demonstrate that the English presumption of a yearly hiring was
applied in the courts." Yet Horace Wood, writing in 1877, ex-
plained: "[w]ith us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefi-
nite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant
seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof."5
This view clearly took hold in a series of cases" and was
later explained to be necessary to support the effort of expanding
industry. 7 A contract of employment was generally treated as
any other contract. Indeed, the law should not interfere with
free-contracting parties, for if the employee cannot be compelled
to remain in his job, the employer should not be compelled to
retain an employee. This view was supported by the United
States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States." The Erdman
Act of 1898, which criminalized the discharge of railway employ-
ees for trade union membership, was held to be unconstitutional
in attempting to compel an employer to retain the services of
14. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 26 N.E. 143 (N.Y. 1891); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio
St. 43 (1882).
15. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 283
(2d ed. 1886).
16. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Offat, 99 Ky. 427 (1896); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Harvey, 99 Ky. 157 (1896) (listing Wood as authority for the hir-
ing-at-will presumption).
17. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943).
18. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
118 [Vol. 57
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another. Thus, although the British common law presumption of
yearly hiring received sporadic recognition, the emerging rule in
the United States during this period was at-will employment,
with no specific term.
It was not until 1930 that Adair was reversed and statutory
exemptions to the at-will rule were accepted by the United
States Supreme Court. 9 In 1937, a major exception was estab-
lished by the Court, when it upheld the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act20 of 1935, which provided general protection for
union activity.21 Some states also introduced fair employment
practice statutes, which gave employees a right to reinstatement
in the event of discriminatory dismissals.22 In spite of these
statutory exceptions, the general rule remained that employment
was terminable at-will. Only employees working under a collec-
tive agreement were given stronger rights. Under these rules,
discharges for good cause were permitted, and this could be en-
forced through arbitration after the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.23
One commentator noted in 1964 that, although employees inside
and outside collective bargaining were treated so differently,
both groups shared a feeling of job ownership.24
The effects of the termination-at-will doctrine were reduced
through the creativity of state supreme courts, with the Montana
Supreme Court taking a leading role in this movement. Leroy
Schramm described how Montana created a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in contracts of employment and explained
the covenant's uneven development. 25 The court first recognized
the covenant in 198 1,2 and then in 1983 the Montana Supreme
Court recognized the breach of the covenant as a tort action.27
This opened up the possibility of punitive and emotional distress
damages. Employers could then be liable for substantial damages
for discharging employees. Schramn also detailed how the Mon-
19. Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry., 281 U.S. 548 (1930)
(considering the Railway Labor Act of 1926).
20. Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1988)).
21. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
22. See F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP OF JOBS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 9-10 (1964).
23. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988)).
24. MEYERS, supra note 22, at 15.
25. See Schramm, supra note 5, at 94-108.
26. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982)
(Gates I).
27. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983)
(Gates II).
1996] 119
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tana Supreme Court, having started the ball rolling, attempted
to prevent the growth of this action by defining the covenant
narrowly and establishing exceptions. This feverish judicial ac-
tivity was resolved in 1987, by the Montana Legislature's pas-
sage of the WDFEA.
Unlike the special tribunals enacted in the United Kingdom,
WDFEA cases are heard in the first instance by a district court
as in any other civil suit. Appeals are heard by the Montana
Supreme Court. Alternatively, arbitration, rather than the
courts, can be used to resolve a dispute.
III. AIMS OF LEGISLATION
Essential to evaluating the success of legislation is a clear
appreciation of its aims. In the United Kingdom, unfair dismissal
was preceded by two major governmental investigations. In 1967,
the National Joint Advisory Council on Dismissal Procedures
(NJAC)28 found that giving workers a greater sense of job secu-
rity enhanced industrial relations.29 Arbitrary dismissals led not
only to industrial action, but left a trail of bitterness and dis-
trust. The Council recommended improved internal voluntary
procedures rather than a statutory scheme, arguing that such
improvements would benefit management by lessening the risk
of inconsistent and ill-considered decisions. Shortly after the
NJAC report, the findings of a Royal Commission chaired by
Lord Donovan were published." The Commission recognized the
significance of employment and jobs to British citizens. Yet,
where the employee had to rely on internal procedures, the final
decision was often in the hands of management, and justice was
not seen to be done. However, a speedy and impartial decision on
the justification of a dismissal was preferred and was likely to
reduce the number of strikes. The Commission, therefore, pro-
posed a statutory scheme intending to provide an incentive to
employers for developing internal procedures. Thus, in the Unit-
ed Kingdom, greater worker rights were introduced with the
object of not only being fair to the employee, but of improving
the efficiency of business through the enhancement of industrial
relations. 1
28. DISMISSAL PROCEDURES: REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL JOINT
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON DISMISSAL PROCEDURES, 1967, at 1 (Eng.).
29. Id.
30. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS 1965-
1968, 1968, CMND 3623 (Eng.).
31. It has been suggested that one influential member of the Commission, 0.
[Vol. 57120
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Whereas in Montana, as noted, the WDFEA came as a result
of employer pressure. Employers and insurance companies were
concerned with the way case law had developed, and were partic-
ularly worried by the possibility of substantial tort damages.
However, employers recognized that they could not simply return
Montana to the termination-at-will philosophy.32 The WDFEA
acknowledges that employees do have rights not to be wrongfully
discharged; at the same time, however, the WDFEA limits dam-
ages. So although the driving force behind the Act was to reduce
employer liability, the pressure group recognized that to achieve
this, they must concede certain rights to employees.
In the United Kingdom, although the trade union had mis-
givings that a statutory scheme would reduce union influence,
there was considerable consensus over the introduction of unfair
dismissal laws. The same cannot be said of the WDFEA, even
though it was enacted by an overwhelming majority. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the stat-
ute in Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc,33 but one dissenter, Justice
Sheehy, commented on the "lack of legislative clout of unorga-
nized workers," who probably comprised the majority of Montana
workers. He concluded his judgement by saying "[t]he only basis
for the Act that I can find is that as between business and work-
ers, the legislature discriminatingly prefers business. That is not
a constitutional basis on which to found a statute."3'
The majority did not address this point directly, as the con-
stitutionality of the Act was evaluated under the rational basis
test, which only requires the Act's purpose to be rationally relat-
ed to a legitimate objective. 35 The court recognized that the Act
addressed what was perceived to be a financial threat, but the
benefits for employees were "not illusory."36 Clearly, although
the WDFEA does address employee rights, its primary aim was
to reduce the potential liability of employers.
Kahn-Freund, advocated the introduction of unfair dismissal to promote more enlight-
ened and successful management control and discipline. See Roy Lewis, Kahn-Freund
and Labour Law: An Outline Critique, 8 INDUS. L.J. 214 (1979).
32. See Schramm, supra note 5, at 109.
33. 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
34. Meech, 238 Mont. at 69, 776 P.2d at 506.
35. Id. at 44-48, 776 P.2d at 506.
36. Id.
1996]
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IV. EXCLUSIONS
A. The Montana Laws
In a comprehensive evaluation of these two laws, it is impor-
tant to determine the extent to which workers are left with no
rights through the employer's ability to circumvent the legisla-
tion. Both the United Kingdom's unfair dismissal law and the
WDFEA apply to employees rather than independent contrac-
tors,37 but otherwise they are very different approaches.
Under the WDFEA, legal redress for discharge which was
"not for good cause" is only available to employees who have
"completed the employer's probationary period of employ-
ment."38 The Act does not define probationary employment, but
the wording suggests that this is a matter for the employer and
that a probationary period was clearly the intention of the legis-
lature.39 Perhaps there is a limit to this loophole, in that a court
could decide that the probation is a complete sham and in fact
did not exist. On the face of it, however, employers have a signif-
icant means to avoid the legislation, by keeping employees per-
petually on probation.
Additionally, an employer can avoid the WDFEA entirely by
hiring an employee on "a written contract of employment for a
specified term."' Under such a contract, an employer would
violate the common law if he or she terminated the worker be-
fore the specified term had lapsed or otherwise breached the
contract. But the well-advised employer could simply not renew
the contract, as no legal obligations would be breached.4' Thus,
written contracts provide another significant loophole to the
WDFEA.
Furthermore, the WDFEA excludes employees "covered by a
written collective agreement." At times an employee may miss
out on an effective remedy because of this provision. In Irving v.
School District No 1-1A,' a school teacher worked under a col-
lective agreement which did not include tenure. A majority of the
37. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-903(3), 39-2-904 (1995); Employment Protec-
tion (Consolidation) Act, 1978, §§ 54(1), 153(1) (Eng. 1978).
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1995).
39. See Schramm, supra note 5, at 116.
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(2) (1995).
41. See Nordlund v. School Dist. No. 14, 227 Mont. 402, 738 P.2d 1299 (1987);
Farris v. Hutchinson, 254 Mont. 334, 838 P.2d 374 (1992).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(2) (1995).
43. 248 Mont. 460, 813 P.2d 417 (1991).
122 [Vol. 57
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Supreme Court found that her discharge after 3 years did not
give her rights under the collective agreement or the WDFEA. In
spite of the loophole evidenced in Irving, employees covered by a
collective bargaining agreement will generally enjoy superior
employment rights. The consequential disinterest of the unions
in the WDFEA may have a more profound effect overall on the
status and rights of workers.
One should also note that the WDFEA cannot be used if
there is a "state or federal statute that provides a procedure or
remedy for contesting the dispute."" The statutes include "those
that prohibit discharge for filing complaints, charges or claims
with administrative bodies or prohibit unlawful discrimina-
tion. . . ."' Since a 1991 amendment, public sector workers
may have a claim under the WDFEA, but many will have reme-
dies provided elsewhere and thus will lose their claim under the
Act.46 The Montana Supreme Court decided that the exclusion
does not operate just because an employee has filed charges with
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).47 The court recog-
nized that there is no procedure or remedy for contesting the dis-
pute until the NLRB has decided to enter the dispute and issue
a formal complaint."
Under the WDFEA in Montana, an action must be brought
within one year of discharge.49 If an employer has written inter-
nal procedures enabling the employee to appeal the discharge,
the employee must first initiate and exhaust these procedures.50
For this provision to operate, the employer must give the em-
ployee written details within 7 days of discharge. 1 An employee
failing to comply will lose his or her action under the WDFEA.
Failing to use these internal procedures includes not complying
with the time limits stipulated in the procedure. Although these
provisions aim to encourage the use of internal procedures and
may make a discharging employer think twice, overall the inter-
nal procedure may prove to be just another hurdle for the em-
ployee seeking redress for wrongful discharge.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1995).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1995).
46. See, e.g, Tonack v. Montana Bank, 258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d 326 (1993)
(holding that a discharged employee's age discrimination claim precluded a WDFEA
remedy).
47. Deeds v. Decker Coal Co., 246 Mont. 220, 222, 805 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1990).
48. Id.
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(1) (1995).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(2) (1995).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(3) (1995).
1996]
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B. The United Kingdom Laws
In the United Kingdom, there are major exclusions regard-
ing qualifications of employment, retirement and fixed terms.52
Where the employees show certain specific reasons for dismiss-
als, e.g., dismissal for trade union membership, they immediate-
ly acquire unfair dismissal rights. In the absence of such a spe-
cific reason for dismissal, the employee must have been em-
ployed continuously for 2 years since 1985."3 This requirement
removes wrongful discharge rights from millions of employees
who may never achieve 2 continuous years of employment with a
single employer in their working lives. If viewed as a probation-
ary period,54 2 years seems very long given that in most situa-
tions an employer will be able to evaluate the employee in a
much shorter period. Yet for the employee there is a significant
advantage in the United Kingdom approach, in that the employ-
er does not have the ability to set the probationary period. Until
recently, United Kingdom employees needed to work a minimum
number of hours per week to qualify, but this hurdle for part-
time workers was found to contravene the European
Community's Equal Treatment Directive55 and has been re-
moved.5" Thus in 1995, many part-time workers have unfair
dismissal rights for the first time.
Upon attaining retirement age, employees in the United
Kingdom generally lose their unfair dismissal rights.5" If the
employer has a normal retirement age, which is the same for
both men and women, that is the relevant age. In all other cases,
e.g., in firms without an established age, employees lose their
rights at 65. Montana's employees do not face a similar hurdle;
they have the advantage of age discrimination legislation.
Unlike the exception under the Montana WDFEA, United
Kingdom employees working on fixed-term contracts may have
52. For other exclusions, see Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act §§ 65,
141, 144, 146A.
53. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act § 64(1)(a); Unfair Dismissal
(Variation of Qualifying Period) Order, S.I. 1985, No. 782 (Eng.).
54. This is the popularly held view, although a period of qualifying employment
was introduced through fear of the tribunals being swamped and has only been justi-
fied in recent years on the basis of reducing the burden on employers. See BUILDING
BUSINESSES . . . NOT BARRIERS, 1986, CMND 9794, T 7.3, at 35 (Eng.).
55. R v. Secretary of State for Employment, 1994 I.R.L.R. 176 (Eng. H.L.).
56. The Employment Protection (Part-time Employees) Regulations, S.I. 1995,
No. 31 (Eng.).
57. The retirement exemption does not apply to certain types of dismissal (e.g.,
dismissal for trade union membership).
124 [Vol. 57
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unfair dismissal rights, similar to those employees working un-
der indefinite contracts. In fact, non-renewal of a fixed-term
contract is specifically deemed to be within the definition of
dismissal. 8 This appears much more favorable to employees
than the WDFEA rule, but this is often not the case. The reason
is that the United Kingdom employer can take advantage of
section 142 of EPCA, which permits exclusion of unfair dismissal
rights where there is a fixed-term of one year or more. Although
exclusion is generally not permitted, the well-advised United
Kingdom employer can acheive exclusion through the use of
fixed-term contracts.
In the United Kingdom, there is also nothing to prevent an
employee from claiming the dismissal breached other legal
rights, although the rules ensure that the employee is only com-
pensated once for his or her loss. Where a contractual right to
notice is significant and has been ignored, the employee will be
advised to bring a separate contract action. The Tribunal's calcu-
lation of compensation for the unfair dismissal would in practice
exclude the loss for lack of notice. If the employee is awarded a
redundancy payment, such payment will be deducted from the
compensation.59 Where a claim has been made under the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975 or Race Relation Act of 1976, the
Tribunal must ensure that the dismissal does not result in a
double award.60
The Montana WDFEA's exclusion of employees working
under collective agreements is not mirrored in United Kingdom
law. As in the United States, United Kingdom trade unions real-
ized that a statutory scheme may undermine the attraction of
trade union membership, yet the Trade Union Congress support-
ed the introduction of unfair dismissal rights. Trade union mem-
bers have the same rights under the law as other employees.
Indeed, trade union officials play a key role in representing
members at internal disciplinary hearings. At the Industrial
Tribunal, the union generally provides representation through
their own official or a legally qualified advocate. By law, one of
the three members of the Industrial Tribunal is a trade union
representative. In short, trade unions are key participants in the
United Kingdom's unfair dismissal system. Whether this benefits
unions is debatable, but it is clearly to the advantage of non-
58. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act § 55(2)(b).
59. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act §§ 73(9), 74(7).
60. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act § 76(2).
1996]
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union employees to have a powerful lobbying group with a vested
interest in the improvement of unfair dismissal law on their
side.
In the United Kingdom, employees are not required to follow
their employer's internal procedures before instigating an action
for unfair dismissal. However, a recent green paper proposed to
change this." In the future, an employee might have to notify
his employer in writing of his grievance, and the employer must
respond within 14 days. Failure to adopt this approach may
invalidate the employee's claim or impinge on issues of fairness
or compensation. Whereas encouraging internal resolution of
disputes is to the advantage of all parties, extra burdens on
employees after dismissal may merely discourage employees
from pursuing their claims. If failing to comply with these inter-
nal procedures influences the Tribunal's determination of the
fairness of the discharge, this will constitute a complete depar-
ture from the jurisprudence developed by the courts and tribu-
nals. 2 In the past, United Kingdom case law has rejected the
idea that failure to use an internal procedure should reduce
damages and has acknowledged the impracticality of estimating
a reduction in compensation due the employee. 3 This is in ac-
cord with other areas of United Kingdom law which do not re-
quire an innocent party to solicit the wrongdoer. Instead of alter-
ing the compensation due the employee, the better way seems to
be for the employer to use the internal procedures to investigate
and review before deciding to dismiss the employee.
V. STANDARDS FOR DIsMIssAL
A. Montana
Section 39-2-904 of the Montana code provides that a discharge
is only wrongful if:
(1) it was retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate
public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy;
(2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee
had completed the employer's probationary period of employ-
ment; or
61. See supra note 4, 11 4.19-.26.
62. See infra text accompanying note 100 (describing how in the United King-
dom the key to fairness is the standard of the employer at the time of dismissal).
63. Lock v. Connell Estate Agents, 1994 I.C.R. 983 (Eng. Employment Appeal
Trib.).
[Vol. 57
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(3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own
written personnel policy.'
The first and third types of discharge are the more specific and
will be considered first.
To help interpret the first type of discharge, public policy is
defined as "a policy in effect at the time of the discharge con-
cerning the public health, safety or welfare established by consti-
tutional provision, statute or administrative rule."65 It is unlike-
ly that an employee will frequently allege this type of discharge,
but the supreme court has already indicated it should not be
interpreted too narrowly. In Krebs v. Ryan Oldsmobile,6 the
district court recognized that the WDFEA protected a "good
faith" whistleblower, but granted summary judgement for the
employer, as the employee's reporting of drug offenses was more
akin to that of an undercover agent. The supreme court dis-
agreed and reversed the decision, holding that such a narrow
interpretation could thwart the purpose of the statute.
Under the WDFEA, the third type of discharge is very spe-
cific in its requirements, yet there is no legal requirement for an
employer to have a "written personnel policy." Thus, an employer
might believe that the best way to avoid liability is to have no
written personnel policy. Clearly this would avoid discharges
under this sub-section. But the lack of internal procedures may
mean an employee is more likely to resort to the courts, particu-
larly as the statute requires employees to first exhaust any such
procedures. 7 Moreover, personnel professionals recommend
written employee policies that embrace a progressive discipline
regime for best employer/employee relations.'
The Montana WDFEA does not provide statutory definitions
for "express terms" or "personnel policy," but these terms are
wider in scope than a guarantee of an internal procedure. In
Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc.,69 an employee hand-
book made numerous references to job security and, in particu-
lar, one section stated: "[o]ur dealership is still growing. You are
thus assured of steady employment as long as you are producing
for us. We expect each of our employees to be maximum produc-
64. MONT CODE ANN § 39-2-904 (1995).
65. MoNT CODE ANN § 39-2-903 (1995).
66. 255 Mont. 291, 843 P.2d 312 (1992).
67. MONT CODE ANN § 39-2-911(2) (1995).
68. JAMEs A. Nys, AN EMPLOYER's GUIDE TO AVOIDING WRONGFUL DIsCHARGE
(1990).
69. 248 Mont. 276, 811 P.2d 537 (1991).
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ers, always doing their part in accomplishing our business objec-
tives."7' The Montana Supreme Court treated this as a person-
nel policy, explaining the jury should decide whether there was a
violation.71
The second type of discharge under the Montana WDFEA,
"not for good cause," appears to be the broadest, although as
already noted it is not available to probationary employees.
"Good cause" is defined as "reasonable job-related grounds for
dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties,
disruption of the employer's operation or other legitimate busi-
ness reason."
72
The notion of good cause does not encompass a requirement
for internal procedures. In Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co.,7 the
district court granted summary judgement to the employer, when
a senior executive was dismissed following dramatic changes in
the oil market in which the company operated. Cecil alleged that
he was discharged without warning and without any indication
of poor performance by himself or the company. 4 The court
agreed on the lack of material issues, 75 but did not expressly
address the issues of internal procedures. The court did address
this issue in Miller v. Citizens State Bank," where the employee
argued that a new standard of good cause, which included indus-
try standards of progressive discipline, should be adopted.77 The
court found this standard inappropriate in the light of the statu-
tory definition.78
The WDFEA's good cause definition of "failure to perform
duties" and "disruptive behavior" has not been particularly prob-
lematic, but the meaning of "other legitimate business reason"
was unclear, even though Cecil confirmed that it included eco-
nomic conditions. In Buck, the employee had "risen from the
ranks to be general manager" of the company and was well re-
spected throughout the automobile industry.79 The business was
70. Id. at 283-85, 811 P.2d at 542.
71. See Loenard Bierman & Stuart A. Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's
Pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 53
MONT. L. REV. 53, 71-73 (1992).
72. MONT CODE ANN § 39-2-903(5) (1995).
73. 244 Mont. 405, 797 P.2d 232 (1990).
74. Cecil, 244 Mont. at 407, 797 P.2d at 233.
75. Id. at 409, 797 P.2d at 235.
76. 252 Mont. 472, 830 P.2d 550 (1992).
77. Miller, 252 Mont. at 473-74, 830 P.2d at 551-52.
78. Id. at 474, 830 P.2d at 552.
79. Buck, 248 Mont. at 279, 811 P.2d at 538.
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later bought by another company which had a long-standing
policy of rewarding its own employees by putting them at the
head of new acquisitions. Buck was discharged, and the employ-
er installed one of its own employees as general manager. The
supreme court, failing to find legislative guidance on the mean-
ing of "legitimate business reason," held:
A legitimate business reason is a reason that is neither false,
whimsical, arbitrary or conspicuous and it must have some
logical relationship to the needs of the business. In applying
this definition, one must take into account the right of an em-
ployer to exercise discretion over who it will employ and keep
in employment. Of equal importance to this right, however in
the legitimate interests of the employee to secure employ-
ment.80
The Montana Supreme Court decided the dismissal clearly fell
within this definition. The employer's policy rewarded long-term
employees who were trusted to look after huge investments. The
court said it would be against common sense and rationality to
decide otherwise, but added a warning that "[a] company's inter-
est in protecting its investment and in running its business as it
sees fit is not as strong when applied to lower echelon employ-
ees, and may therefore be outweighed by their interest in contin-
ued, secure employment."81
In spite of references to employee interests, the court seems
to place greater emphasis on the needs of the business. In Buck
the court asserted that "[i]t is inappropriate for the courts to
become involved in the day to day employment decision of busi-
ness."82 Moreover, according to Cecil, an employer is entitled to
be motivated by and serve its own legitimate business interest,
and can decide who it will hire and retain. 3
In Kestell v. Heritage Health Care Corporation,' the su-
preme court discussed employer and employee interests, explain-
ing that: "[t]he balance should favor an employee who presents
evidence and not mere speculation or denial, upon which a jury
could determine that the reasons given for his termination were
false, arbitrary or capricious and unrelated to the needs of the
80. Id. at 281-82, 811 P.2d at 540.
81. Id. at 283, 811 P.2d at 541.
82. Id. at 282, 811 P.2d at 541.
83. Id.
84. 259 Mont. 518, 858 P.2d 3 (1993).
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business."85 Thus, if the employer provides a particular reason
for discharge, the employee must raise factual issues to defeat
the employer's summary judgement motion. Therefore, an em-
ployee who merely disagrees with an employer's claims will not
withstand summary judgment. This burden of proof seriously
disadvantages the employee, because it is the employer who
made the firing decision and only he or she can really know the
reason behind it.
B. Standards in the United Kingdom
Certain reasons for dismissal are given special protection
under the United Kingdom's law, and they must be given proper
consideration before looking at the general standards. The law
provides long-standing and important protection for employees
who have been dismissed for belonging to an independent trade
union or taking part in its activities." Furthermore, no mini-
mum period of continuous employment is required; dismissals for
these reasons are automatically unfair and attract much larger
compensation awards than other dismissals." This protection is
an important guarantee of the right to associate, although the
protection to trade union activists has been weakened by judicial
interpretation." Thus, the protections offered under the United
Kingdom laws approximate those in the United States under the
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act.89 In the United King-
dom, the legal protection for requiring employees to belong to a
union in order to work has been dismantled and now dismissal
for non-membership of a union is always unfair."
In the United Kingdom, there have been considerable addi-
tions and amendments to the law relating to specific reasons for
dismissal, particularly through the Trade Union Reform and
Employment Rights Act of 1993. 9' Thus where the dismissal
occurs through the employee asserting any of a variety of statu-
tory rights, e.g., carrying out a safety function or becoming preg-
85. Kestell, 259 Mont. at 526, 858 P.2d at 8.
86. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1992, ch. 52, § 152 (Eng.).
87. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act § 152.
88. See City of Birmingham v. Beyer, 1977 I.R.L.R. 2111 (Eng. Employment Ap-
peal Trib.) (holding that trade union activities in a previous job were not within the
special protection).
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
90. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act § 152.
91. But see Sunday Trading Act, 1994, ch. 20 (Eng.); Deregulation and Contract-
ing Out Act, 1994, ch. 40 (Eng.).
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nant, dismissal is unfair regardless of the employee's period of
continuous employment. Unlike the specific protection provided
under the Montana Act, there is no general protection for
"whistleblowers" in the United Kingdom or a requirement that
employers comply with their personnel policies. However, the
absence of such provisions is unlikely to be fatal to the
employee's cause, as unfairness may be established under the
general provisions discussed below, provided the employee has
the requisite 2 years of continuous employment.
Another area of unfair dismissal which is specifically ad-
dressed under the United Kingdom law is the type of dismissal
experienced in Buck. To bring the United Kingdom in compliance
with a European Community Directive,92 Parliament passed the
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regula-
tions in 1981."3 Where an undertaking, including a business, is
transferred through sale or other disposition, the employment
contracts are transferred. 4 According to regulation 8(1), where
either before or after the transfer, an employee of the transferor
or transferee is dismissed due to the transfer, the dismissal is
unfair.95 The employer has a defense under regulation 8(2),
where the dismissal is for "an economic, technical or organisation
reason entailing changes in the workforce."96 An employer
would not be able to establish this if it simply replaced one se-
nior manager with another-as in Buck-for the case law re-
quires as a prerequisite for the defense a change in the overall
numbers or functions of employees.9" Yet, the Transfer of Un-
dertaking Regulations have considerable limitations. In particu-
lar, they do not apply where a business is bought through a
share transfer; however, despite this limitation, as the regula-
tions are now being interpreted they provide effective protection
for many United Kingdom employees.9"
92. Directive No. 77/187 of the Council of Feb. 1977 on the approximation of
the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in
the event of tranfers of undertakings, business or parts of business, 1977 O.J. (L
61/26).
93. S.I. 1981, No. 1794 (Eng.).
94. Id. § 5.
95. Id. § 8(1).
96. Id. § 8(2).
97. Berriman v. Delabole State Ltd., 1985 I.R.L.R. 305 (Eng. C.A.).
98. Much case law has centered on the privatization of public services under
the compulsory competitive tendering policy. Interpretation of the regulations in the
light of the European Community Directive has enhanced employee rights. Recently
in Milligan v. Securicor Cleaning Ltd., 1995 I.R.L.R. 288 (Eng.), the Employment
Appeal Tribunal decided that dismissals under regulation 8(1) are protected even if
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In most cases, the employer's reason for dismissal will be
judged fair or unfair under section 57 of the Employment Protec-
tion (Consolidation) Act of 1978. The employer must prove the
reason for dismissal, and this reason must fall within a list of 5
reasons: 1) capability or qualifications; 2) conduct; 3) redundan-
cy; 4) inability to work without contravening a statute; or 5)
some other substantial reason.9 Additionally, the reason must
be valid at the time of dismissal."°° The onus of proof is clearly
on the employer to establish the reason, and if the Tribunal dis-
believes the employer, the dismissal is unfair. Although the
employer bears this burden, it is not normally difficult for the
employer to prevail, because the tribunal merely requires a rea-
sonable belief that the supplied reason is sufficient. Once the
reason is established, fairness or unfairness depends on whether
in the circumstances (including the size and administrative re-
sources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted rea-
sonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for
dismissing the employee; and that question shall be determined
in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the
case. ' Each case turns on its facts, but precedent shows that
there is a range of reasonableness, within which one employer
might reasonably take one view, whereas another could quite
reasonably take a different view. 1"2 If the dismissal falls within
this range it is fair; if it falls outside it is unfair. It is not for the
tribunal to decide what it would do; it must compare the actions
of the particular employer with other employers' possible actions
to determine fairness. United Kingdom courts and tribunals ac-
cept that business must change; thus, even where a reorganiza-
tion is a breach of contract, dismissals that follow have been held
to be fair."0 3 This deference to employers is very similar to that
demonstrated in Montana.'0
However, when one considers requirements for following and
creating internal procedures for appealing unfair dismissals,
the employer lacks 2 years continuous employment. Milligan, 195 I.R.L.R. at 290-91.
This decision is the subject of an appeal.
99. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act § 57.
100. W. Devis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkin, 1977 I.C.R. 662 (Eng. H.L.).
101. Very unusually for United Kingdom law there is no onus of proof.
102. Union of Constr. Allied Trade & Technicians v. Brain, 1981 I.R.L.R. 224
(Eng. C.AK).
103. Hollister v. National Farmers Union, 1979 I.R.L.R. 238 (Eng. C.A.).
104. See, e.g., Kestell v. Heritage Health Care Corp., 259 Mont. 518, 525, 858
P.2d 3, 7 (1993) (holding that "courts should not intrude on the day-to-day employ-
ment decisions of business owners").
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United Kingdom law is very different from the Montana
WDFEA. Although employers are not specifically obliged to oper-
ate internal procedures, they are encouraged to do so in various
ways. At the outset of employment, the employer is required to
provide the employee with details of the employment which must
include information on disciplinary procedures. l5 Important
standards are set by the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration
Service (ACAS), through its Code of Practice on Disciplinary
Practice and Procedures. It gives guidance on a system of pro-
gressive warnings and internal appeals. Since the House of
Lords decision in Polkey v. A. E. Dayton Services Ltd.," proce-
dural fairness is often crucial in determining reasonableness in
an unfair dismissal action, and the ACAS code is particularly
influential. The Lords explained that in the great majority of
cases the employer will not act reasonably unless he takes ap-
propriate procedural steps. Such high standards are not expected
of the small employer, who may argue that the statute requires
an Industrial Tribunal to take into account the size and adminis-
trative resources of the undertaking. Also, the Lords accepted
that the employer will at times reasonably believe a fair proce-
dure would be "utterly useless."0 7 Despite these exceptions,
however, procedural fairness is a key element of the standard of
fairness in the United Kingdom, whereas in Montana it plays no
part in the concept of discharge for good cause.0 8 Indeed, pro-
cedural fairness plays such a significant role in the United
Kingdom's law that fairness to a particular employee may be-
come irrelevant. For example, In Monie v. Coral Racing Ltd.,"
the employer could not determine which of two employees was
dishonest. He therefore dismissed both. The court recognized the
employer's predicament and his behavior was judged reasonable.
For an apparently innocent employee, the end result was the loss
of a job and a finding that the dismissal was fair. A similar re-
sult in Montana is possible given the emphasis on employer
105. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act §§ 1, 3.
106. 1987 I.R.L.R 503 (Eng. H.L.).
107. See Duffy v. Yeomans & Partners Ltd., 1994 I.R.L.R. 642 (Eng. C.A.).
108. Industrial relations specialists interviewed saw little future as expert wit-
nesses under the Act. All they could do was confirm whether the written personnel
policy was complied with. Yet arguments about procedural fairness may return. Giv-
en that a legitimate business reason must not be "false, whimsical, arbitrary or ca-
pricious," Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., 248 Mont. at 276, 282, 811 P.2d
537, 540 (1991), it seems the existence or absence of procedures may assist a court
in applying this part of the definition.
109. 1980 I.R.L.R. 464 (Eng. C.A_).
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needs, but perhaps case law developing from the interest in
balancing employee needs will avoid such a divergence from
common sense notions of fairness.
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, industri-
al relations specialists recognize the advantages of procedural
fairness. Through a system of progressive discipline and proce-
dural guidelines, less arbitrary dismissals will occur and employ-
ees are encouraged to improve; any disputes over a dismissal can
be dealt with internally without resort to an expensive legal
action. In Montana, considerations of internal, procedural fair-
ness play no part of the notion of "good cause." Indeed, by includ-
ing a violation of a personnel policy as a separate section of the
WDFEA, the law may actually be discouraging internal business
procedures. Whereas in the United Kingdom, the growth of pro-
cedures is arguably the most important benefit flowing from the
introduction of unfair dismissal laws. Unfortunately, its legal
significance has depended on judicial creativity rather than stat-
utory law, and in consequence its application has varied as
judges have wavered. Nevertheless, the promotion of procedural
fairness as a consideration in an employee's discharge stands out
as one of the advantages in the United Kingdom system.
VI. ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVE
In Montana, legal controversies can be referred to arbitra-
tion," ° and the WDFEA encourages this form of alternative
dispute resolution. If an employee's offer of arbitration is accept-
ed by the employer and the employee succeeds in the arbitration,
the employee is entitled to have the employer pay the
arbitrator's fee and all costs of arbitration."' Additionally,
where either party offers to go to arbitration and the offer is
rejected, the offering party is entitled to recover attorney fees if
he or she prevails in that action." Thus there are clear finan-
cial incentives in arbitration for both parties beyond the tradi-
tional benefits attributed to arbitration. As with many forms of
alternative dispute resolution, these benefits include speed, cost,
informality and finality."' Also, the employer often places a
110. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(1) (1995).
111. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(4) (1995).
112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-915 (1995).
113. See Paul F. Gerhart & Donald P. Crane, Wrongful Dismissal: Arbitration
and the Law, 48 ARB. J. 56, 57-59 (June 1993). For an example of the court's refusal
to vacate a wrongful discharge arbitration award, thereby indicating the finality ben-
efit, see May v. First Nat'l Pawnbrokers Ltd., 269 Mont. 19, 887 P.2d 185 (1994).
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higher value on the lack of publicity by avoiding trial.""
Despite the intent of the Montana Legislature, however,
arbitration is fairly rare under the WDFEA. Commentators re-
cently investigated the experiences of the Montana Bar and
found that in 1,076 cases, only 67 (or 6.3%) were resolved
through arbitration.1 The responses showed that lawyers pre-
ferred court procedures, formal discovery and jury trials. They
also believed some arbitrators were biased and that Montana
lacked arbitrators. Anecdotal evidence in 1995 suggests that, al-
though alternative dispute resolution is generally becoming more
accepted, the picture for the WDFEA has not changed signifi-
cantly. Given the low numbers of cases going to arbitration and
the availability of arbitrators in neighboring states, the lack of
local arbitrators is unlikely to be the major problem. There
seemed to be a marked preference for arbitrators without the
experience of collective bargaining arbitration. This may explain
the view, put forth in the recent commentary, that some arbitra-
tors are biased,1 16 even though the law is clear that the same
standards should apply in both court and arbitration proceed-
ings.
If arbitration is to become the norm, much more needs to be
done in Montana to change the attitudes of lawyers and others.
In the United Kingdom, although the law promotes internal
procedures and encourages settlements with the help of concilia-
tors from the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, an
industrial tribunal must decide the issue if it remains unre-
solved. Specifically, section 65 of the EPCA allows unfair dis-
missal rights to be replaced by arbitration under a dismissal
procedures agreement made between the employer and trade
unions. To date, only one employer/union agreement, in the elec-
trical contracting industry, has been approved. 7 In any indus-
try, only a small proportion of dismissals would be considered by
an Industrial Tribunal, and thus the considerable work required
to achieve an approved scheme is a major disincentive. 8
One should note the potential significance of arbitration in
114. See NYS, supra note 68, at 8 (dealing the advantages to employers of se-
lecting arbitration).
115. Leonard Bierman et al., Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment
Act: The views of the Montana Bar, 54 MONT. L. REV. 367, 373-76 (1993).
116. Bierman et al., supra note 115, at 375.
117. The agreement was approved in 1979. For detailed account of the re-
quirements for the formal exclusion of voluntary procedures, see STEVEN D.
ANDERMAN, LAW OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL app. III (2d ed. 1985).
118. See LINDA DICKENS ET AL., DISMISSED (1985).
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this arena. Many criticisms levelled at the unfair dismissal sys-
tem, particularly that of excessive legalism, are believed to arise
due to the dominant role of lawyers, and it has therefore been
argued that arbitration is the answer."' Lewis and Clark have
explained how such a system might work, suggesting that a
definition of fairness be derived from the industrial relations
forum rather than using the statutory definition.12 ° The recent
green paper, Resolving Employment Rights Disputes, Options for
Reform, draws on this work and proposes arbitration as an alter-
native to an industrial tribunal. 1 ' The green paper suggests,
though, that the arbitrator take into account statutory law, not
case law. Given the importance of case law in determining fair-
ness, it seems that unless arbitration is conducted in complete
ignorance of employment law, such an approach will be difficult
to implement and will lead to confusion. The green paper's goal
is cost reduction, but any proposals receiving serious consider-
ation should look carefully at the standard applied and be wary
of creating two standards. Thus, arbitration in the United King-
dom is in a critical position, with great potential and uncertainty
before it.
There is a much stronger case for arbitration in Montana
than in the United Kingdom. In Montana the alternative is a
judge and jury with no particular expertise in employment mat-
ters. Whereas in the United Kingdom, the alternative is a tribu-
nal with a legally qualified chair who specializes in employment
law, including two lay members chosen by the different sides of
industry. The lay members play a pivotal role in determining the
reasonableness of a dismissal, by bringing their industrial exper-
tise to the tribunal. The parties in Montana do not have the
advantage of this "industrial jury"; the arbitration alternative is
therefore more attractive.
119. Id. ch. 9.
120. Roy LEWIS & JON CLARK, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS AND
ARBITRATION: THE CASE FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 25 (1993).
121. RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS DISPUTES: OPTIONS FOR REFORM, 1994,
CMND 2707, at 31-33 (Eng.).
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VII. COMPARITIVE REMEDIES UNDER THE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
LAWS
A. Montana
In Montana, under the WDFEA, neither a court nor an arbi-
trator has the power to order re-employment; the employer re-
tains the absolute right to discharge an employee. The Act pro-
vides that the employee can recover wages and fringe benefits for
a period not exceeding 4 years from the date of discharge. Also,
employees must mitigate their losses, and income they could
have earned or any income they did in fact earn must be deduct-
ed from the award.'22 Finally, the Act does not permit damages
for emotional distress or punitive damages unless it is estab-
lished that the employer engaged in fraud or malice by discharg-
ing the employee in violation of Montana Code Annotated 39-2-
904 (1).
In applying these remedy provisions, the calculation of the
actual amount is left to the trier of fact.2 3 In exercising its dis-
cretion, the trier may award zero compensation. This was the
sound decision of the jury in Tyner v. Park County," where
the employee had only been unemployed for 5 months, had failed
to take up an early employment opportunity, and finally took a
new job at a higher wage than previously earned at Park
County.
25
As noted, a limit on the amount of damages was crucial for
the designers of the WDFEA to overcome the threat of excessive
awards. In deciding the Act was rationally related to a legitimate
state interest and therefore constitutional, the Montana Supreme
Court recognized the reduction in damages must be weighed
against the advantages to employees of extended rights and
greater certainty in the law. 2 The appropriateness of the level
of damages can be assessed by determining whether employees
are encouraged to bring actions and whether employers are de-
terred from arbitrary discharges.
122. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1995).
123. Weber v. State, 253 Mont. 148, 153, 831 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1992).
124. 271 Mont. 355, 897 P.2d 202 (1995).
125. Tyner, 271 Mont. at 361, 897 P.2d at 206; see also Dawson v. Billings Ga-
zette, 223 Mont. 415, 419, 726 P.2d 826, 829 (1986) (approving a zero damage award
by a jury that concluded plaintiff failed to mitigate damages).
126. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 43-52, 776 P.2d 488, 501-06
(1989).
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Recent research by commentators' into the attitudes of
the Montana Bar revealed that, whereas 52% of attorneys be-
lieved there were adequate incentives to sue under the Act, only
20% of plaintiffs' attorneys held such a belief. The survey also
found the level of damages led to little incentive for attorneys to
take on cases, and nearly half admitted to a declining number of
cases under the Act. A majority of attorneys felt business person-
nel practices had been influenced by the WDFEA, but how these
practices have altered is not made clear. This initial research
into one interest group is not conclusive, but the evidence dis-
closed is not encouraging.
B. United Kingdom
Remedies under the United Kingdom's law provide for more
than monetary damages. In the United Kingdom, an Industrial
Tribunal finding unfair dismissal must consider reinstatement,
then re-engagement, and finally compensation. An order for
reinstatement directs the employer to treat the employee in all
respects as if he or she had not been dismissed.'28 In contrast,
a tribunal order for re-engagement directs the employer to en-
gage the employee in comparable or other suitable employ-
ment.'29 If the employer fails to comply with such an order, he
or she will be penalized by having to pay additional compensa-
tion. '3 These re-employment remedies must be particularly
attractive to employees at periods of high unemployment, but the
statistics show these orders are only made in less than 3% of
cases. '3 The infrequency of these orders stems partly from em-
ployees not wishing to return, but the courts and tribunals have
also shown a reluctance to foist an employee on an unwilling
employer.'32 In practice, then, the remedy for an unfair dis-
missal is generally monetary compensation.
The total compensation for the unfair dismissal in the Unit-
ed Kingdom is comprised of a basic award and a compensatory
award.' The basic award attempts to value the employee's
accrued service and can be calculated from the employee's age,
127. Bierman et al., supra note 115.
128. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act § 69(2).
129. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act § 69(4).
130. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act §§ 71, 75A.
131. 102 Employment Gazette 24 (1994).
132. See Michael Bennett, The Practicality of Reinstatement and Re-engagement,
23 INDUST. L.J. 164 (1994).
133. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act ch. 44, §§ 73-74.
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salary and length of service. The basic award has a current max-
imum of £6,150."M The compensatory award, which has a cur-
rent maximum of £11,000,135 should compensate the employee,
rather than punish the employer. In doing this it must not com-
pensate for mental distress.13 The industrial tribunal can re-
duce compensation on various grounds, and, similar to the Mon-
tana law, the compensatory award is subject to the rule of miti-
gation. There are more substantial awards for specific reasons
for dismissal, such as trade union membership, but the low max-
imum applies to most cases and the median compensation in
1990/91 was £1,773.2"7
The re-employment orders provided under United Kingdom
law are attractive on their face, in that they remedy the situa-
tion by restoring the original employment relationship. Existing
unfair dismissal law clearly makes these orders the primary
remedies, but the practice in tribunals shows a reluctance to use
them. Thus, in both the United Kingdom and Montana, the rem-
edy in most cases is a financial award. In the United Kingdom
the calculation of a basic award means the employee will gain
some compensation, even though he quickly finds new employ-
ment. Compensation in Montana appears more attractive, in that
4 years salary is in most cases greater than the United Kingdom
maximum of £17,150. Indeed, the United Kingdom maxima
stand out as being low, for Parliament did not index them for
inflation, and awards for discrimination, which have no maxi-
mum, are much higher. Whether in practice the level of damages
in Montana is sufficient to compensate employees and deter
employers is uncertain at this point.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article does not attempt a complete review of both the
WDFEA and unfair dismissal law in the United Kingdom. Rath-
er, the article looks at the Montana statute, and, by way of com-
parison, draws on the experience of a similar law in the United
Kingdom. The article highlights weaknesses in the WDFEA and
looks for strengths in unfair dismissal law to remedy them.
134. The Unfair Dismissal (Increase of Compensation Limit) Order, S.I. 1993, No.
1348 (Eng.) (amending the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act ch. 44, § 68, to
increase the compensatory award).
135. The Unfair Dismissal (Increase of Compensation Limit) Order, S.I. 1993, No.
1348 (Eng.).
136. Norton Tool Co., Ltd. v. N. J. Newson, 1972 I.R.L.R. 86 (Eng. N.I.R.C.).
137. 99 Employment Gazette 638 (1991).
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Thus, at times it may appear unbalanced, as it does not dwell on
some weaknesses in unfair dismissal, e.g., undue legalism.'38
The article does, however, produce a study of manageable length,
which attempts to shed light on the development of employment
protection law. The conclusions are made on the basis that an
effective system has advantages for both employees and employ-
ers.
Other than making arbitration mandatory, it is difficult to
see what more the legislators in Montana could have done to
encourage this form of dispute resolution. The evidence suggests
considerable resistance to arbitration by the Montana Bar, and
therefore any information campaign showing the advantages of
arbitration should be directed towards employees and employers
themselves. As noted, the arguments for arbitration are stronger
in Montana than the United Kingdom, given the Montana alter-
native is a court with no particular expertise. If arbitration be-
comes the norm, hearings will generally be more informal and
will seek practical solutions. In this environment, re-employment
may be seen as an obvious next development and less of a threat
to employer control.
The possibility for employer-engineered exclusion from the
WDFEA in Montana, through the use of fixed terms and long
probationary periods, is significant. Therefore, the challenge of
avoiding the effect of the WDFEA, rather than the challenge of
complying with it, may be the primary concern of some employ-
ers. Whereas the exclusion of employment under collective agree-
ments may have advantages for unions, its corrorally is that
unions have no interest in improving the law.
It is not surprising that Montana's WDFEA seems primarily
concerned with employer interests. Courts realize their task is
not to manage enterprises, and they are concerned that an overly
invasive approach will put the jobs of others in jeopardy. The
United Kingdom experience shows that the law can modify em-
ployer behavior by encouraging internal procedures to ensure
fairness. But the comparision to the United Kingdom's law also
demonstrates that procedural fairness needs to be part of statu-
tory law, as unfair dismissal has suffered fluctuation through
judicial precedent over the years.3 9 As the WDFEA currently
138. For an example of the complex contractual principles used to explain con-
structive dismissal, see Western Excavation (E.C.C.) Ltd. v. Sharp, 1978 I.R.L.R. 27,
29-30 (Eng. C.A.).
139. In the early days of unfair dismissal, procedures were regarded as vital, but
after British Labour Pump v. Byrne, 1979 I.R.L.R. 94 (Eng. Employment Appeal
[Vol. 57
26
Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/5
UNFAIR DISMISSAL
stands, the strongest encouragement for procedures are put on
the employee after dismissal, and this may prove to be an addi-
tional hurdle for the discharged employee. Thus, procedural
fairness incorporating progressive discipline needs to be incorpo-
rated into the key statutory definition of "good cause" within the
Montana Act.
The courts and legislators of Montana have reflected the
demands of both employees and employers in regulating the
employment relationship. The spotlight will remain on Montana
to see how the law is applied and developed in the upcoming
years.
Trib.), procedural defects were ignored as the tribunal felt they made "no difference"
to the overall outcome. This was overruled by Polkey v. Dayton Servs Ltd, 1987
I.R.L.R. 503 (Eng. H.L.)
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